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KILLING THE BIRDS IN ONE FELL SWOOP:
SOLID WASTE AGENCY OF NORTHERN COOK




In Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. United States
Army Corps of Engineers' ("SWANCC"), the Supreme Court held
that an isolated, intrastate wetland did not come under Corps juris-
diction, for purposes of the Clean Water Act ("CWA"), only because
it served as a seasonal habitat for migratory birds. 2 In deciding that
the exercise of such Corps jurisdiction would be a federal usurpation
of powers reserved tc the states, the Court applied the bright-line
rules of the Commerce Clause 3 extension formulated in United
States v. Lopez4 to the complex and intertwined areas of the hydro-
logic and biological cycles. The application of this bright-line rule,
which was written to deal strictly with economic activity6 without
taking into account the complexities of these natural phenomena, led
to a skewed and contradictory holding. Although the majority of
isolated intrastate non-navigable waters, no longer under Corps Sec-
tion 404 permit jurisdiction, will continue to be regulated under
1. Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. United States
Army Corps of Eng'rs, 531 U.S. 159 (2001).
2. Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1344
(2000).
3. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (granting Congress power to
"regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several
States, and with the Indian Tribes").
4. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
5. Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County, 531 U.S. at 588.
6. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 556.
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other federal and state programs,7 the SWANCC decision represents a
step backwards in the effort to control pollution. It incorrectly in-
validates environmentally protective and regulatory regimes based
on the notion that the destruction of such isolated wetlands would
have a major negative impact on the entire nation's hydrological and
biological cycles.
SWANCC came before the Supreme Court on appeal from the Sev-
enth Circuit on October 31, 2000, and was decided on January 9,
2001.8 The Corps argued that the CWA is constitutionally valid leg-
islation properly empowering the Corps, through the Migratory Bird
Rule, 9 to regulate the use of isolated intrastate waters that function as
the habitat of migratory birds.10 The Solid Waste Agency of North-
ern Cook County ("the Agency"), argued that to allow federal regu-
lation of isolated, non-navigable, purely intrastate waters that are not
used in interstate commerce would be to allow federal power to
override state power in completely local affairs."
The Agency was formed in 1986 as a municipal corporation made
up of 23 municipalities in Northern Cook County. Its goal was to
locate and develop a site for non-hazardous waste disposal. 12 The
Agency identified and subsequently purchased a 533-acre site, lo-
cated in both Cook and Kane counties, in Illinois. 13 The site was an
abandoned strip mine, which had given way to an early stage forest
with a scattering of permanent and seasonal ponds of various areas
and depths which had evolved from excavation trenches. 14 Vegeta-
tion included nearly 170 plant species, and many small animals
made the area their permanent home.15 Most importantly, more than
7. Clean Water Act Regulatory Definition of "Waters of the
United States," 68 Fed. Reg. 1991, 1994 (proposed Jan. 15, 2003).
8. Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County, 531 U.S. at 159.
9. Migratory Bird Rule, 51 Fed. Reg. 41,217 (Nov. 13, 1986).
10. Brief for the Federal Respondent at 11-13, Solid Waste
Agency of N. Cook County, 531 U.S. 159 (2001) (No. 99-1178).
11. Brief for the Federal Petitioner at 44, Solid Waste Agency of
N. Cook County, 531 U.S. 159 (2001) (No. 99-1178).
12. Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County, 531 U.S. at 162-63.
13. Id. at 163.
14. Id.
15. Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. United States
Army Corps of Eng'rs, 191 F.3d 845 (7th Cir. 1999), at 848, vacated
by 531 U.S. 159 (2001).
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100 species of migratory birds, many of which were endangered wa-
ter-dependant migratory birds, had been observed at the site breed-
ing, resting, and feeding.' 6 Notably, the site was the seasonal home
of the second-largest breeding colony of great-blue herons in north-
eastern Illinois. 17
In order to use all 533 acres of the site for balefill,' 8 the Agency
needed to fill in about 17.6 acres of the small lakes and ponds within
the forest.' 9 Consequently, the Agency was required to file for
county and state permits. The Agency also contacted the Corps to
determine whether a federal landfill permit under Section 404(a) of
the CWA was needed. 20 The Corps originally concluded that both
the 276-acre and 414-acre parcels submitted by the Agency for deci-
sion did not qualify as "wetlands" under Section 404, and therefore
were outside Corps jurisdiction. 2 1 However, the Corps reversed its
decision as to the larger parcel, claiming jurisdiction, after the Illi-
nois Nature Preserves Commission reported that many migratory
birds, including some water-dependant species, had been observed
22there. The Corps notified the Agency by letter on November 16,
1987, that the parcel would be subject to the requirements of section
404 of the CWA because the acres "are or could be used as habitat
by migratory birds which cross state lines."2
3
Pursuant to this determination, the Agency submitted permit appli-
cations to the Corps, all of which were refused, because of the area's
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. A "balefill" is defined in the case as "a landfill where the
waste is baled before it is dumped." Id.
19. Id.
20. Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. United States
Army Corps of Eng'rs, 531 U.S. 159, 163 (2001).
21. Id. at 164.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 165. The definition of "waters of the United States" had
been assumed to include all waters, regardless of their relation to
interstate commerce, which fell under the Migratory Bird Rule. This
rule allowed the Corps to claim jurisdiction to regulate isolated intra-
state waters in two cases: if the water is or would be the habitat of
birds protected by Migratory Bird Treaties, or if the water is or
would be used as habitat by migratory birds crossing state lines. See
33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(3) (2001).
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designation as a migratory bird habitat.24 After the second denial,
the Agency sued the Corps, arguing that the Migratory Bird Rule
was an incorrect basis for application rejection, and challenged the
25
rejection on the merits. The District Court for the Northern District
of Illinois entered summary judgment in favor of the Corps on the
jurisdiction issue, and the Agency appealed to the Seventh Circuit.26
In the appeal, the Agency again attacked both the Corps use of the
Migratory Bird Rule and its assertion that the presence of migratory
birds alone was sufficient basis for asserting Corps jurisdiction under
the CWA over isolated, non-navigable, intrastate waters. 27  The
Agency also advanced the argument that regardless of whether the
wetlands were bird habitats Congress lacked the power to extend the
Commerce Clause to the extent necessary to grant the Corps jurisdic-
tion over them.2 8 Finally, the Agency argued that the Migratory Bird
Rule was invalid because it had not been enacted in accordance with
the Administrative Procedure Act.2 9
The Seventh Circuit Decision
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals first noted that, prior to Lo-
pez, courts had consistently held that Congress had the power to
regulate waterways based solely on the presence of migratory
birds.30 The court then analyzed the Migratory Bird Rule in light of
the Lopez interpretation of the Commerce Clause, and decided the
Rule would be constitutionally invalid unless it regulated an activity
that "substantially affects interstate commerce." 3 1 The court looked





29. Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. United States
Army Corps of Eng'rs, 191 F.3d 845 (7t' Cir. 1999), at 848, vacated
by 531 U.S. 159 (2001).
30. Id. (citing Reuth v. EPA, 13 F.3d 227 (7th Cir. 1993); Leslie
Salt Co. v. United States, 896 F.2d 354 (9 th Cir. 1990)).
31. Id. In Lopez, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the principle that a
federal statute whose power stemmed from the Commerce Clause
must either be related to the regulation of channels of interstate
commerce; regulation or protection of the instrumentalities of inter-
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to the cumulative impact doctrine of Wickard v. Filburn, which
states that even "a single activity that itself has no discemable effect
on interstate commerce may still be regulated if the aggregate effect
of that class of activity has a substantial impact on interstate com-
merce." 32 In assessing the cumulative impact of migratory birds on
interstate commerce the court cited data from the United States Fish
& Wildlife Service's 1996 National Survey of Fishing, Hunting, and
Wildlife-Associated Recreation.33 The survey showed that, during
the 1996 calendar year, approximately 3.1 million Americans spent
$1.3 billion to hunt migratory birds, with approximately 11 percent
of those hunters crossing state lines.34 The survey also found that
17.7 million people undertook interstate travel to observe migratory
birds.35 The court found this to be compelling evidence that the de-
struction of habitat, and its attendant decrease in the numbers of mi-
gratory birds, would "substantially affect" interstate commerce. 36
The court conceded that this argument may not be viable for every
isolated body of water; but found that in the aggregate the effect on
interstate commerce of wetland destruction and attendant migratory
bird population loss was clear and may be sufficient to allow federal
regulation under Commerce Clause powers. 37 The court also noted
the existence of many international treaties and conventions for mi-
gratory bird protection as an indication that the problem could not be
handled at the local or state level.38
Second, the court noted that because Congress has the power to
regulate such waters, it is reasonable for the Corps to interpret the
state commerce, or regulation of activities that "substantially affect"
interstate commerce. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558
(1995). To be valid, the Migratory Bird Rule, like the Lopez gun-
control statute, must be an exercise of this third type of regulatory
power.
32. Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. United States
Army Corps of Eng'rs, 191 F.3d 845 (7' Cir. 1999), at 850, vacated
by 531 U.S. 159 (2001) (citing Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111,
127-128 (1942)).
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CWA as delegating that power to them.3 9 Finding the Agency's in-
terpretation of the CWA to be reasonable and that the Act was de-
signed to reach as many waters as constitutionally possible,n° the
court deferred to the Corps' interpretation.41
Lastly, the court found the Migratory Bird Rule to be merely an in-
terpretive rule, and therefore exempt from the notice and comment
requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act.42 Although the
Agency argued that the Rule is a new substantive rule, the court
found it to be merely a clarification of the scope of federal jurisdic-
tion included in the phrase "waters of the United States" in the
CWA.4 3 The court noted that the preamble of the Rule includes ex-
amples of waters covered and not covered under "waters of the
United States," which is generally indicative of an interpretive rule.
an
The Supreme Court Decision
The Agency again argued before the Supreme Court that the Corps
lacked the right, under the CWA and the Commerce Clause of the
United States Constitution, to assert jurisdiction over isolated intra-
state waters solely based on their status as habitats for migratory
birds.45 The Agency argued: first, that the CWA did not give the
Corps such authority;4 6 and second, that even if the CWA on its face
granted this authority, such a delegation of power by Congress was
unconstitutional. n7
39. Id. at 851.
40. Id. See Reuth v. EPA, 13 F.3d 227, 231 (7' Cir. 1993).
41. Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County, 191 F.3d at 851 (cit-
ing Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837 (1984) (holding that the court shall interpret a statute as per the
plain meaning of the text, but if the statute is ambiguous or silent on
the issue, defer to reasonable agency interpretation of the agency
charged by such statute)).
42. Id. at 852.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Brief for the Federal Petitioner at I, Solid Waste Agency of N.
Cook County, 531 U.S. 159 (2001) (No. 99-1178).
46. Id. at 13.
47. Id. at 36.
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In defense of its right to assert jurisdiction over isolated intrastate
waters using the Migratory Bird Rule, the Corps made two argu-
48 49ments. The first argument was that Chevron deference should be
given to the Corp's interpretation of the scope of the CWA.5 ° The
second argument was that the Migratory Bird Rule, per Lopez, was a
constitutionally valid use of federal power to regulate an activity that
"substantially impacts" interstate commerce. 51
The Supreme Court reversed the Seventh Circuit. In a decision
written by Chief Justice Rehnquist the Court held that the Corps had
exceeded its authority in asserting jurisdiction over the Agency's
site. The Court reasoned that while the CWA broadly asserts federal
,,52jurisdiction over "waters of the United States, this jurisdiction is
elsewhere restricted to "navigable waters." 53 The Corps' interpreta-
tion of the Migratory Bird Rule as covering the Agency site there-
fore exceeded its authority because the Agency wetlands could not
reasonably be defined as "navigable." 54 Although the Corps argued
that activities associated with the migratory birds using the Agency
site had substantial economic impact on interstate commerce, the
Court found that impact not to be substantial enough to warrant read-
ing the term "navigable" out of Section 404(a).5 Thus, the Court
found that the CWA could not be extended to cover isolated intra-
state waters and wetlands solely because of the presence, or possible
presence, of migratory birds.56
The Court concluded that the word "navigable" grants Corps juris-
diction only over waters navigable-in-fact and their adjacent waters
and wetlands where discharge or fill in these waters or wetlands af-
48. Brief for the Federal Respondent at I, Solid Waste Agency of
N. Cook County, 531 U.S. 159 (2001) (No. 99-1178).
49. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467
U.S. 837 (1984).
50. Brief for the Federal Respondent at I, Solid Waste Agency of
N. Cook County, 531 U.S. 159 (2001) (No. 99-1178).
51. Id.
52. 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) (1994).
53. 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a) (1994).
54. Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. United States
Army Corps of Eng'rs, 531 U.S. 159, 174 (2001).
55. Id. at 173.
56. Id. at 174.
2004]
260 FORDHAM ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW
fects the waters navigable-in-fact. 57 The Court's interpretation is
based upon its view of the CWA as a regulation to ensure the navi-
gability of lanes of interstate commerce and not as a broader protec-
tive statute.58 The Court opined that if Congress had meant the
CWA to cover isolated intrastate waters and wetlands, it would have
chosen other language when drafting the Act.
59
The Court did not defer to the Corps' interpretation of the CWA.
Although when following Chevron, courts normally defer to agency
interpretations of statutes affecting their operations, the Court here
found such deference would be inappropriate under the circum-
stances. The Court reasoned that when an agency's interpretation
invokes the outer edge of congressional power, and especially when
such an interpretation leads to an encroachment of federal power
over authority traditionally reserved for states, Chevron deference is
inappropriate unless there is clear indication that Congress intended
such a result.
60
Justice Stevens, joined in dissent by Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and
Breyer, argued that the majority based its decision on two incorrect
assumptions. 6 1 First, the majority assumed that when Congress
passed the CWA in 1972, it intended to exert federal Commerce
Clause power over only "navigable" waters. 62 Although early fed-
eral water regulations related only to the preservation of the naviga-
bility of those waters navigable-in-fact, the focus had shifted to the
prevention of environmental degradation by the time the CWA
63promulgated. Therefore, although Congress carried over the old
term "navigable water," it broadened the definition of that term to
"waters of the United States" in an effort to protect more of the
aquatic ecosystem.64  Although the majority felt that extending
Corps regulation to isolated intrastate waters would be reading the
term "navigable" out of the statute, Congress effectively took such
action when it deleted the term from the definition in Section
57. Id. at 170.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 171.
60. Id. at 172-73.
61. Id. at 177 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
62. Id. at 175.
63. Id. at 177.
64. Id.
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65502(7). The dissent thus argued that the term "navigable waters" is
shorthand for "waters over which federal authority may properly be
asserted. 66
The majority's second error, according to the dissent, was its as-
sumption that Congress meant to limit regulatory power of the Corps
under the CWA to waters navigable-in-fact along with their immedi-
ately adjacent waters and wetlands. The dissent pointed to the fail-
ure of bills in Congress that tried to limit the Corps' authority to
"waters which are presently used or are susceptible to use in their
natural condition or by reasonable improvement as a means to trans-
port interstate or foreign commerce. ' 67 Additionally, the dissent
pointed to the 1977 congressional amendments to the CWA, which
specifically list isolated waters that do not fall under federal regula-
tion, as proof that Congress understood isolated waters not listed to
fall under Corps control.68
Deference, the dissent asserted, should have been granted to the
Corps' interpretation of "navigable waters" and the Migratory Bird
Rule. In United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc. ,69 the Court
had earlier held that the Corps' interpretation of its jurisdiction was
entitled to Chevron deference. 70 The dissent also asserted that there
was no problem of federalism which would negate deference, as the
majority held, since Section 404(g) specifically promotes state con-
trol over waters otherwise regulated by the Corps under the CWA.7 1
The majority did not reach the question of whether the Migratory
Bird Rule would be constitutional if explicitly promulgated by Con-
gress.72 In the dissent, Justice Stevens argued that the "substantial
65. Id. at 181; see also S. REP. NO. 92-1236, at 144 (1972), re-
printed in 1 Leg. Hist. 327 (stating that the definition of "navigable
waters" as "waters of the United States" in section 502(7) is to "be
given the broadest possible constitutional interpretation").
66. Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County, 531 U.S. at 182 (Ste-
vens, J., dissenting).
67. Id. at 185. (citing 123 CONG. REc. 10420, 10434 (1997)).
68. Id. at 188.
69. United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121
(1985).
70. Id. at 191.
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impact" of migratory birds on interstate commerce makes the regula-
tion of habitat destruction, which would affect migratory bird num-
bers, a proper power of Congress under the Commerce Clause.73
The dissent also argued that the power to regulate interstate com-
merce necessarily includes the power to regulate resources, which
generate such commerce.74 Additionally, the Migratory Bird Rule,
unlike the regulations at issue in Lopez and Morrison, regulates a
"national" rather than a "local" concern, and thus correctly falls un-
der the umbrella of federal powers. 75 The dissent distinguished the
Migratory Bird Rule from the regulations in Lopez and Morrison by
arguing that the connection between the filling of isolated waters
used as habitat by migratory birds and the decline of interstate com-
merce associated with migratory birds was not attenuated, but was
instead direct and substantial.76
II. BACKGROUND
The Constitution vests in Congress the power to regulate interstate
commerce. 77 Although such power was narrowly construed at first,
it was gradually broadened7 8 to become virtually limitless as U.S.
73. Id. at 193. See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 129 (1942)
(finding that the federal government can invoke the Commerce
Clause to regulate individual actions when the sum of such actions,
taken as a class, exert a substantial impact on interstate commerce).
74. Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County, 531 U.S. at 193 (Ste-
vens, J., dissenting).
75. Id. at 195. This is because, like with other environmental
regulations, the benefit of habitat destruction is local while the costs
are national. In this case, the locality gets a new landfill but the
country and even neighboring nations lose much of the migratory
bird population. In such cases, described by economists as involving
"externalities," federal regulation is proper.
76. Id. at 196.
77. Id. at 174-74.
78. Shreveport Rate Cases, 234 U.S. 342 (1914) (incidental intra-
state commerce regulation authorized under Commerce Clause when
necessary for full regulation of intertwined interstate commerce): see
also, The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. 557 (1870) (Commerce Clause vests
the federal government with the power to regulate intrastate com-
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Courts upheld congressional regulation with only the most attenu-
ated effect on interstate commerce. 79 Federal Commerce Clause
power reached its zenith in Wickard v. Filburn, which upheld con-
gressional power to regulate purely intrastate activity that merely
affected interstate commerce. Beginning in 1995 in United States
v. Lopez,81 and later in United States v. Morrison8 2 and Jones v.
83United States, the Supreme Court took a closer look at the limits of
federal power to regulate intrastate activities under the Commerce
Clause. In those decisions, the Court limited that power to the regu-
lation of "channels of interstate commerce," activities that "substan-
tially affect" interstate commerce, and instrumentalities of interstate
commerce.
84
The Clean Water Act evolved from the Rivers and Harbors Appro-
priations Act of 189985 and prior versions of the Federal Water Pol-
lution Control Act first enacted in 1948.86 When the Rivers and
Harbors Appropriations Act ("RHA") was enacted, there was no
concept of environmentalism or environmental protection. The Act
was simply a means to regulate and maintain the physical navigabil-
merce on a navigable waterway of the U.S. when a portion of the
items being transported are to be further transported interstate).
79. Jonathan H. Adler, Wetlands, Waterfowl, and the Menace of
Mr. Wilson: Commerce Clause Jurisdiction and the Limits of Fed-
eral Wetland Regulation, 29 ENVTL. L. 1, 7 (Spring 1999).
80. Wickard v. Filbum, 317 U.S. 111, 129-29 (1942) (finding that
the federal government may regulate growing wheat in amounts
above federal quota, even if solely for personal use, due to the "ag-
gregate affect" on interstate commerce if all farmers did the same).
81. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 556 (1995).
82. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
83. Jones v. United States, 529 U.S. 848 (2000).
84. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558-59 (reaffirming the "cumulative effects
doctrine", allowing regulation of trivial events when the effects of
such events, taken as a class, would have a substantial effect on in-
terstate commerce).
85. Rivers and Harbors Appropriations Act of 1899, 30 Stat.
1152, 33 U.S.C.A. §§ 403,407, 411 (1972).
86. Federal Water Pollution Control Act of June 30, 1948, Pub. L.
No. 80-845, ch. 750, 62 Stat. 1155.
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ity of U.S. waterways. 87 As such, it regulated only the discharge or
deposit of refuse that would impede or obstruct navigation into any
"navigable waters of the United States," as well as discharge into
tributaries from which it may flow and block navigable waters. 88 On
the other hand, the Federal Water Pollution Control Act was enacted
during the "environmental decade," by which time the importance of
controlling water pollution, both physical and chemical, had been
generally accepted.89 Through multiple revisions of the Act,9°
greater import was placed on regulating all dredging and filling.91 In
1972, the Federal Water Pollution Control Act was significantly re-
vised to become the CWA.9 2 However, the original language of
"navigable waters" 93 was kept to describe the reach of the federal
discharge and fill permit program under Section 404(a) of the new
Act. In contrast to the old RHA, the CWA had as its stated objective
the "restoration and maintenance of the chemical, physical and bio-
logical integrity94 of the Nation's waters."
95
Although it kept the language of its predecessor statute, the CWA
was enacted at a time when nature and the environment were gaining
importance in the national consciousness. 96 In the 1972 amendments
87. Rivers and Harbors Appropriations Act of 1899, 30 Stat.
1152, 33 U.S.C.A. §§ 403, 407, 411 (1972).
88. Id.
89. Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1956, Pub.L.
No. 84-660, ch.518, 70 Stat. 498.
90. Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1961,
Pub.L. No. 87-88, 75 Stat. 204; Water Quality Act of 1965, Pub. L.
No. 89-234, 79 Stat. 903; Clean Water Restoration Act of 1970, Pub.
L. No. 91-24, 84 Stat. 91.
91. S. REP. NO. 92-414, at 75 (1971).
92. H.R. REP. NO. 92-911 (1972).
93. Rivers and Harbors Appropriations Act of 1899, 30 Stat.
1152, 33 U.S.C.A. §§ 403, 407, 411 (1972).
94. "Integrity" is defined as the "condition in which the natural
structure and function of ecosystems is maintained." H.R. REP. NO.
92-911 (1972).
95. Id.
96. A year before the major 1972 Federal Clean Water Act
amendment, the Senate recognized that "Water moves in hydrologic
cycles and it is essential that discharge of pollutants be controlled at
the source." S. REP. NO. 92-414 (1971).
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to the CWA, Congress made clear that it wished to maintain the "in-
tegrity" of the Nation's ecosystems. 97 Additionally, it found that
"any change induced by man which overtaxes the ability of nature to
restore conditions to 'natural' or 'original' is an unacceptable pertur-
,,98bation. This was the beginning of regulations whose objective
was the preservation of the "ecosystem," that of the oceans, the vari-
ous navigable waters, and their adjacent wetlands.99 However, the
retention of the RHA language created problems for the Corps in
implementing their regulatory power, due to confusion as to the
scope of that power.1l° In 1975, the Corps was sued for using too
narrow a definition of "navigable waters," and the District Court for
the District of Columbia ordered the Corps to revise its regulatory
interpretation of the phrase.' 0' The Corps then published four alter-
native jurisdictional plans and as of July 1975, new regulations were
put in place.102 The language of Section 404 was changed to "navi-
gable waters and adjacent wetlands." 10 3 Later amendments changed
the Corps' definition of "navigable waters and adjacent wetlands" to
97. See id. at 75.
98. Id. at 77.
99. H.R. REP. No. 95-139, at 56 (1977). In which, President
Jimmy Carter lauds efforts to protect coastal and inland wetlands due
to their biological richness and importance for many species of bird
and fish, as well as their import in the hydrologic cycle. Id.
100. Id. at 21.
101. Nat'l Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Callaway, 392 F. Supp. 685,
687 (D.D.C. 1975).
102. H.R. REP. No. 95-139 (1977).
103. Id. at 20. "Navigable waters" are defined as those which "are
presently used or are susceptible to use in their present condition or
with reasonable improvement to transport interstate or foreign com-
merce." This definition "omits the historical test of navigability"
found in the RHA, thereby allowing jurisdiction over waters that had
been, but were not presently being, used as commercial shipping
routes. As of July 1977, "adjacent wetlands" were defined to be
"primary tributaries of navigable waters of the United States, natural
lakes greater than five acres in surface area and ... other waters gen-
erally up to the headwaters, where streams flow less than five cubic
feet per second." Id.
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266 FORDHAM ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW
"waters of the United States.' 4 In 1977, the Corps defined "waters
of the United States" to include "waters such as intrastate lakes, riv-
ers, streams (including intermittent streams), mudflats, sandflats,
wetlands, sloughs, prairie potholes, wet meadows, playa lakes, or
natural ponds, the use, degradation, or destruction of which could
affect interstate or foreign commerce."
' 0 5
The Corps interpretation of Section 404 of the CWA became
broadest with the Migratory Bird Rule. 1°6 This Rule extended per-
mit requirements to include those waters which "are or would be
used as habitat by birds protected by Migratory Bird Treaties ' ' 10 7 or
which "are or would be used as habitat by other migratory birds
which cross state lines."'1 8 Although seemingly a sweeping exten-
sion of its jurisdiction, the Corps was quick to point out that this in-
terpretation was just a clarification of the scope of Section 404, not a
broadening. 10 9 The Corps contended that the Senate in 1972 had all
but written the "navigable" requirement out of the definition of wa-
ters under Section 404 when it announced that "navigable waters"
should be given "the broadest possible constitutional interpreta-
tion."110 Therefore, the Corps was to regulate all "waters of the
United States"' 1 whose use, degradation, or destruction would affect
interstate or international commerce.1 12 Based on this broadened-to-
the-full-constitutional-extent view of waters covered, the Corps un-
104. Federal Water Pollution Control Act § 404(a), 33 U.S.C. §
1344 (1994).
105. Id.
106. 51 Fed. Reg. 41,217 (Nov. 13, 1986).
107. The Supreme Court found the federal government had power
to enforce regulations within the several states as an Article 1, Sec-
tion 8 Constitutional "necessary and proper" means to execute the
international treaty-making power of the federal government. See
Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 432 (1920).
108. 51 Fed. Reg. 41,217 (Nov. 13, 1986).
109. Id.
110. United States v. Byrd, 609 F.2d 1204, 1209 (7th Cir. 1979)
(citing S.REP. No. 92-1236, at 144 (1972)).
111. Including lakes, streams, mudflats, wetlands, and sloughs.
RODGERS & WILLIAM, ENVTL. L., AiR & WATER, 196, § 4.12
(1986).
112. Nat'l Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Callaway, 392 F.Supp. 685,
687 (D.D.C. 1975).
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derstood its spelling out of the terms of the Migratory Bird Rule to
be only a clarification. Statistics from the U.S. Census Bureau show
that millions of Americans annually spend more than a billion dol-
lars to hunt, trap, and observe migratory birds, 113 and that these ac-
tivities frequently involve interstate travel.1 14 The destruction of
migratory bird habitat and the ensuing decrease in bird populations
"substantially affect" interstate commerce, placing the regulation of
any and all isolated intrastate waters, as "waters of the United




Different Circuits, ruling both before and after the Lopez decision,
addressed the regulation of isolated wetlands and the ability of the
Migratory Bird Rule to withstand Commerce Clause challenges,
reaching different conclusions.
The Seventh Circuit, in Hoffman Homes v. United States Environ-
mental Protection Agency ("Hoffman Homes i,,), 116 vacated its ear-
lier decision 117 and found that the Corps could not claim jurisdiction
113. Hoffman Homes, Inc. v. EPA, 999 F.2d 256, 261 (7th Cir.
1993).
114. 3.1 million Americans spent $1.3 billion to hunt migratory
birds in 1996, 11 percent crossed state lines to do so. 17.7 million
people observed birds in states outside their state of residence, 14.3
million took such trips specifically for this purpose. FISH &
WILDLIFE SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR & BUREAU OF THE
CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, 1996 NAT'L SURVEY OF
FISHING, HUNTING, & WILDLIFE-AsSOCIATED RECREATION 25 (Nov.
1997).
115. The Migratory Bird Rule as a regulation of "activities that
substantially affect interstate commerce", falls within the federal
powers granted in the Commerce Clause. See United States v. Lo-
pez, 514 U.S. 556, 558-59 (1995).
116. Hoffman Homes v. United States Envtl. Prot. Agency, 961
F.2d 1310, 1311 (7" Cir. 1997).
117. Hoffman Homes v. United States Envtl. Prot. Agency, 999
F.2d 256 (7th Cir. 1993).
20041
268 FORDHAM ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW
over isolated intrastate waters.1 8 In Hoffman Homes I, the court had
held that due to congressional desire to give the term "navigable wa-
ters" the "broadest possible constitutional interpretation," the Corps
could assert jurisdiction based on the Migratory Bird Rule.119 How-
ever, if Corps jurisdiction was based on the Migratory Bird Rule
alone, and the Rule was based on Commerce Clause powers, the
Corps would have to prove that the activity it sought to regulate
would have an impact on interstate commerce.12  Therefore, the
Corps could not claim jurisdiction over isolated waters solely be-
cause of the presence of migratory birds, without some showing that
interstate commerce would be affected.
121
In contrast, the Ninth Circuit has upheld Corps jurisdiction over
seasonal, isolated wetlands under the Migratory Bird Rule and the
Commerce Clause. 122 Leslie Salt Co. v. United States concerned
ponds, originally created by the company for salt production, which
provided temporary habitat for migrating birds. 123 The Ninth Circuit
overturned the district court's holding which found that the artificial
genesis of the ponds and the fact that they were dry much of the year
left them outside the scope of "other waters" as defined by 33 C.F.R.
§ 328.3(a)(3). 124 Instead, the court found that "the commerce clause
power, and thus the Clean Water Act, is broad enough to extend the
Corps' jurisdiction to local waters which may provide habitat to mi-
gratory birds and endangered species. '' 25
The court found that the Migratory Bird Rule was merely an inter-
pretation by the Corps of the statutory term "waters of the United
States," and that the interpretation should be given deference.'
26
Under a deferential analysis, the court found it reasonable for the
118. Hoffman Homes, 961 F.2d at 1311.
119. Id. at 1317 (citing Byrd, 609 F.2d 1204, 1209 (7th Cir. 1979)
(citing S.R. No. 92-1236, at 144 (1972)).
120. Id. at 1319.
121. Id. at 1320.
122. Leslie Salt Co. v. United States, 896 F.2d 354 (9th Cir. 1990),
rev'd, 700 F.Supp. 476 (N.D. Cal. 1989), cert. denied, 498 U.S.
1126 (1991), aff'd, 55 F.3d 1388 (91h Cir.), cert. denied sub nom.
Cargill, Inc v. United States, 516 U.S. 955 (1995).
123. Leslie Salt, 55 F.3d at 1391.
124. Id.
125. Leslie Salt, 896 F.2d at 360.
126. Leslie Salt, 55 F.3d at 1393-94.
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Corps to interpret the Act to include isolated intrastate waters pro-
viding habitat for migratory birds, under the "cumulative effects"
doctrine of the Commerce Clause. 127 In Cargill, Inc. v. United
States,128 the Supreme Court denied certiorari to the Leslie Salt peti-
tioners. In his dissent, Justice Thomas argued that the regulation of
wholly intrastate, isolated, non-navigable waters, serving as a stop
for migratory birds without attracting people to watch or photograph
them, extends the Commerce Clause further than the regulation of
weapons in school districts, which had been held unconstitutional in
Lopez. 
129
In 1997, the Fourth Circuit held that the Corps' inclusion of waters
"whose degradation 'could affect' interstate commerce ' 130 under the
definition of "waters of the United States" over which they had ju-
risdiction was invalid because it was unauthorized by the CWA as
limited by the Commerce Clause.1 31 They held that since "waters of
the United States" was a definition of the statutory term "navigable
waters," it would refer to either navigable-in-fact waters, interstate
waters, or waters closely related to navigable or interstate waters.
132
The Fourth Circuit found that although the Supreme Court had found
the definition of "waters of the United States" to be valid, it had ex-
plicitly limited its holding to wetlands actually adjacent to navigable
waterways. 133 The Fourth Circuit therefore held that the Corps had
exceeded its authority under the CWA by including isolated waters
under its jurisdiction. 134
127. Id.
128. See Hoffman Homes v. United States Envtl. Prot. Agency, 999
F.2d 256 (7th Cir. 1993).
129. Cargill, Inc. v. United States, 516 U.S. 955, 967-68 (1995)
(dissenting opinion of Justice Thomas based upon the Court's deci-
sion to deny certiorari from the Ninth Circuit's opinion in Leslie Salt
Co. v. United States, 55 F.3d 1388).
130. 33 C.F.R. § 328.3(a)(3) (1993).
131. United States v. Wilson, 133 F.3d 251, 253-54 (4th Cir. 1997).
132. Id. at 257.
133. Id. (citing United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes Inc.,
474 U.S. 121 (1985), which held that "[b]ecause respondent's prop-
erty is part of a wetland that actually abuts on a navigable waterway,
respondent was required to have a permit in this case.").
134. Wilson, 133 F.3d at 257.
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In yet another important pre-SWANCC case, the District Court for
the Northern District of Illinois held for the EPA, thereby upholding
Corps' jurisdiction, both in denying a motion for summary judg-
ment 35 and in its eventual verdict in United States v. Hallmark.A 
6
Hallmark Construction had bought land from Swift Research Farms
to develop a housing subdivision.137 The land included a five-acre
area which naturally retained water and was classified as a "season-
ally flooded farmed wetland" by a civil engineering firm retained by
Hallmark. 138 The court held that the Lopez decision did not prohibit
the Corps from exercising jurisdiction over wetlands based solely on
the presence of migratory birds. 139 Nevertheless, the court con-
cluded that the Corps lacked jurisdiction because the government
had never proven that the area was actually used by migratory birds.
Prior to Lopez, the Supreme Court had held in Riverside Bayview
Homes that the Corps' authority under Section 404 extended to all
wetlands adjacent to navigable or interstate waters and their tributar-
ies. 14 The Court accepted that this "adjacency" could be created
through an inundation or saturation of the areas through either sur-
face or underground connection. 141  In holding that low-lying,
marshy land connected to navigable waters only through groundwa-
ter inundation was still "adjacent" for Section 404 purposes 142 the
Court reversed the Sixth Circuit holding that a surface hydrologic
connection was needed. 143 The Court also held that the CWA was
specifically intended to combat the degradation of the aquatic eco-
system. 144 Congress, the Court found, had intended the term "navi-
gable" to be of limited import in order to allow the broadest reach of
135. United States v. Hallmark, 14 F. Supp. 2d 1069, 1077 (N.D.
111. 1998) (denying defendants motion for summary judgment).
136. United States v. Hallmark, 30 F. Supp. 2d 1033 (N.D. Ill.
1998).
137. Hallmark, 14 F. Supp. 2d at 1071.
138. Id.
139. Hallmark, 30 F. Supp. 2d at 1042.
140. United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S.
121, 124 (1985).
141. Id. at 460.
142. Id. at 461.
143. United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, 729 F.2d 391, 392
(6th Cir. 1984).
144. Riverside Bayview Homes, 474 U.S. at 132.
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federal regulation, and had rejected in the 1977 CWA amendments
the narrower definition of "navigable waters" adopted by the Corps
in 1975.145 The Court further found that even the narrower defini-
tion would include waters navigable-in-fact and their adjacent wet-
lands. 146 Thus, the Corps definition of "navigable waters" and "adja-




Post-SWANCC, disputes regarding Corps jurisdiction over isolated
waters have led to a range of holdings. Decisions have ranged from
the restriction of Corps' jurisdiction to waters that are navigable-in-
fact and their immediate tributaries and wetlands, to decisions that
have upheld Corps regulation in all cases except those where the sole
basis for Corps' jurisdiction over isolated, intrastate, non-navigable
waters was the Migratory Bird Rule. The only possible guarantee of
a future court ruling on Corp's jurisdiction is to bind the parties to an
agreement designating a prior decision by a court as controlling, as
was done in United States v. Krilich.
148
Some courts have applied the SWANCC reasoning broadly, invali-
dating CWA-based Corps jurisdiction over all waters except those
navigable-in-fact or their immediate tributaries and wetlands. The
leading case is Rice v. Harken,14 9 from the Fifth Circuit. Called to
145. Id. at 464.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 465.
148. United States v. Krilich, 303 F.3d 784 (7th Cir. 2002). A con-
sent decree was signed in 1992 by Krilich and the EPA which bound
parties to follow the Hoffman Homes I decision (notwithstanding
that it had already been vacated) in determining the jurisdictional
reach of the Clean Water Act over the property in question. The Dis-
trict Court found the consent decree to be binding, and Krilich there-
fore in violation of the decree for filling waters which, under Hoff-
man Homes I, would need a section 404(a) fill permit, notwithstand-
ing the fact that the SWANCC Supreme Court decision would make
the waters owned by Krilich beyond the reach of the Corps).
149. Rice v. Harken, 250 F.3d 264 (5th Cir. 2001) (rehearing de-
nied).
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interpret the scope of "navigable waters" under the Oilfield Pollution
Act ("OPA"), the court found it to be the same as that of "navigable
waters" in the CWA. 15 Relying on the SWANCC decision, the Fifth
Circuit then concluded that a body of water is only subject to regula-
tion under these acts if it is navigable-in-fact or adjacent to an open
body of navigable water. 
151
A few district courts, reading SWANCC broadly, as exemplified by
the Harken court, sought to limit CWA jurisdiction. In United States
v. Rapanos,152 the government presented evidence of a direct surface
hydrologic connection with navigable waters through a collection of
ditches, drains, and creeks that finally emptied into a navigable river
and bay.' 53 The District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan
agreed that the goal of the CWA is to curtail water pollution, and
therefore some waters not navigable-in-fact must fall under CWA
jurisdiction. 154 However, the court found that because the wetlands
in this case were twenty linear miles from navigable waters, they
were not "adjacent" and therefore fell outside the jurisdictional reach
of the CWA.
155
In Needham v. United States,156 a case concerning OPA jurisdic-
tion, the District Court for the Western District of Louisiana relied
on Harken in deciding that the scope of OPA "navigable waters"
was the same as under the CWA. 157 Consequently, the court found
that a non-navigable drainage ditch was not under federal jurisdic-
150. Id. at 267.
151. Id. at 269.
152. United States v. Rapanos, 190 F. Supp. 2d 1011 (E.D. Michi-
gan 2002) (government appeal pending).
153. Id. at 1014-15.
154. Id. at 1016 (citing Riverside Bayview Homes, 474 U.S. 121,
134 (1985), where wetlands adjacent and directly emptying into a
navigable waterway were included in CWA jurisdiction because wa-
ter flows in hydrologic cycles, and in order to accomplish the goal of
the CWA to curtail water pollution, federal CWA jurisdiction in-
cludes any adjacent wetlands in reasonable proximity of navigable
waters).
155. Rapanos, 190 F.Supp. at 1015.
156. Needham v. United States, 2002 WL 1162790 (W.D. La.
2002) (government appeal pending).
157. Id. at*l.
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tion due to lack of sufficient adjacency to navigable waters. 15 8 Simi-
larly, in United States v. Newdunn Associates,'59 the District Court
for the Eastern District of Virginia held that wetlands connected to
navigable water through miles of direct surface hydrologic connec-
tion were not "adjacent" and should therefore be classified as "phase
three" isolated, non-adjacent waters. 16° This category had been re-
moved from CWA jurisdiction by the SWANCC decision. 161 The
same court, in United States v. RGM Corp.,' 62 limited the Corps to
the originally legislated scope of jurisdiction under the CWA, waters
navigable-in-fact and their non-navigable tributaries only to the end
of a continuous high-water mark, 163 and refused to give Chevron
deference to any unlegislated Corps determination seeking to
broaden jurisdiction. 164 Therefore, the court found wetlands not ac-
tually contiguous with navigable waters to be non-adjacent, and to
fall outside the scope of CWA jurisdiction. 165
Some courts read SWANCC very narrowly, holding that it invali-
dates only the Migratory Bird Rule, and using it to deny Corps Sec-
tion 404 jurisdiction only in cases where the sole basis for jurisdic-
tion was the use, or possible use, of the isolated water or wetland by
migratory birds as a habitat. In United States v. Interstate General
Co.,166 the Maryland District Court limited the application of
SWANCC to the Supreme Court's o specific holding that "the 'Mi-
158. Id.
159. United States v. Newdunn Associates, 195 F. Supp. 2d 751
(E.D. Va. 2002) (government appeal pending).
160. Id. at 764.
161. Id.
162. United States v. RGM Corp., 222 F. Supp. 2d 780 (E.D. VA.
2002) (government appeal pending).
163. Id. at 787. The 1975 regulations define "navigable waters" to
include, among others, "(e) All tributaries of navigable waters of the
United States up to their headwaters and landward to their ordinary
high water mark." § 33 C.F.R. 209.120(2)(i)(e). This refers to the
high water mark caused by the upstream tidal flow of water from
navigable waters into its tributaries. Id.
164. RGM Corp., 222 F. Supp. 2d at 787.
165. Id. at 788-89.
166. United States v. Interstate Gen. Co., 152 F. Supp. 2d 843 (D.
Md. 2001), aff'd 39 Fed. Appx. 870, 2002 WL 1421411 (4th Cir.
2002).
2004]
274 FORDHAM ENVIRONMENTAL LAW REVIEW
gratory Bird Rule' is not fairly supported by the CWA." 167 More-
over, since the Corps in Interstate General asserted jurisdiction over
some wetlands due to their adjacency to the headwaters of two non-
navigable creeks, which drain into a navigable river, the court held
the SWANCC decision to be inapplicable to the case. 168 Similarly, in
United States v. Rueth Development Co., 1 69 the Northern District of
Indiana held that the SWANCC decision did not apply to the wet-
lands at issue since the basis for asserting jurisdiction over the wet-
lands was "adjacency" to navigable waters rather than a sole reliance
on the Migratory Bird Rule.
170
Other courts have found the Corps retains jurisdiction under the
CWA, even after SWANCC, on waters not directly adjacent to navi-
gable waters, so long as there is a connection, even an attenuated
one. The Ninth Circuit held, in Community Association for Restora-
tion of the Environment v. Henry Bosma Dairy, that SWANCC does
not change the principles of the CWA, and that regardless of
SWANCC, the fact that the water drained through connecting water-
ways into a navigable river was enough to make it a "tributary" and
allow Corps jurisdiction.' 7 ' In United States v. Lamplight Eques-
trian Center,172 the District Court for the Northern District of Illinois
held that regardless of SWANCC, the CWA reaches tributaries even
when there is no unbroken surface hydrologic connection and even
when the distance from the tributary to the navigable water is sig-
nificant.173 The court found that even in such a situation, the quality
of the tributary is still vital to the quality of the navigable water.
174
167. Id. at 847 (citing Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v.
United States Army Corps of Eng'rs, 531 U.S. 159 (2001)).
168. Id.
169. United States v. Rueth Development Co., 2001 WL 17580078
(N.D. Ind. 2001).
170. United States v. Interstate Gen. Co., 152 F. Supp. 2d 843, 877
(D. Md. 2001), aff'd 39 Fed. Appx. 870, 2002 WL 1421411 (4th Cir.
2002).
171. Cmty. Ass'n for Restoration of the Envt. v. Henry Bosma
Dairy, 305 F.3d 953, 954 (9th Cir. 2002).
172. United States v. Lamplight Equestrian Ctr., 2002 WL 360652
(N.D. Ill. 2002).
173. Id. at *8.
174. Id.
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In Aiello v. Town of Brookhaven, 175 the District Court for the Eastern
District of New York found that the Corps' definition of "navigable
waters" still extended to all intrastate waters whose degradation or
destruction would affect interstate or foreign commerce. 176 There-
fore, the court found the pond and creek in question, although ques-
tionably navigable in the classical RHA sense, comprised at least a
non-navigable tributary of a navigable water, and thus fell under
CWA jurisdiction. 177
Some courts have upheld CWA jurisdiction over waters not di-
rectly adjacent to navigable waters, post-SWANCC, but put some
outer limits on the reach of the CWA over such non-continuous non-
navigable waters. In United States v. Buday,178 the District Court of
Montana recognized that the Migratory Bird Rule was too tenuous a
basis for federal jurisdiction and that jurisdiction does not exist over
activities that merely "could" affect interstate commerce. However,
the Court found that Congress had intended to protect waters to the
fullest extent of its Commerce Clause power.' 79 The Court therefore
held that there is no limitation on federal jurisdiction over open wa-
ters that flow into interstate or navigable-in-fact waters because of
the direct impact of their degradation on interstate commerce.1 80 In
Headwaters v. Talent Irrigation District,181 the Ninth Circuit found
all waters contributing their flow to a larger body of water are tribu-
taries covered by CWA jurisdiction. 82 The court held that although
the canals in question flow only intermittently, they are not "iso-
lated" and therefore are not outside CWA jurisdiction per SWANCC,
since they still exchange water with and impact the health of naviga-
175. Aiello v. Town of Brookhaven, 136 F. Supp. 2d 81 (E.D.N.Y.
2001).
176. Id. at 120 (finding that the court retains pre-SWANCC limits
on Corps power as defined through pre-SWANCC cases and agency
definitions).
177. Id.
178. United States v. Buday, 138 F.Supp.2d 1282 (D. Mont. 2001).
179. Id. at 1294-95.
180. Id.
181. Headwaters v. Talent Irrigation Dist., 243 F.3d 526 (9th Cir.
2001).
182. Id. at 533.
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ble waters.1 83 The District Court for the District of Idaho, in Idaho
Rural Council v. Bosma,18 4 found that CWA jurisdiction includes all
waters that are tributaries of navigable water, and even extends to
those waters where a direct groundwater hydrologic connection to
navigable water can (or cannot?) be proven. 5
III. REGULATORY EFFECTS OF SWANCC
In the aftermath of the SWANCC decision, the Corps has issued an
Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking to determine the regula-
tory definition of "waters of the United States" and the scope of wa-
ters subject to the CWA. 18 6 The Corps takes a narrow reading of the
SWANCC decision, holding that it only eliminates Corps jurisdiction
over isolated intrastate waters when the sole basis for jurisdiction
under the CWA predicates upon the Migratory Bird Rule.' s7 Since
various courts have had very different understandings of the impact
of the SWANCC decision, the Corps is now in the process of prom-
ulgating a new agency interpretation of "navigable waters" and "wa-
ters of the United States" to provide guidance to courts in determin-
ing future cases.' While the outer limit of CWA jurisdiction is in
question, there is no dispute that traditional navigable waters and
directly adjacent wetlands as well as waters subject to tidal flux and
directly adjacent wetlands continue to be properly regulated under
the CWA.1
89
Due to overlap among the many federal and state programs aimed
at protecting the environment and rehabilitating damaged areas, 190
183. Id. The destruction of the tributary does not need to immedi-
ately impact navigable waters but so long as the impact will eventu-
ally be felt by navigable waters, the SWANCC decision is inapplica-
ble in as much as it only applies to isolated intrastate waters. Id.
184. Idaho Rural Council v. Bosma, 143 F.Supp.2d 1169 (D. Idaho
2001).
185. Id. at 1180.
186. 68 Fed. Reg. 1991.
187. Id. at 1993.
188. Id. at 1995.
189. Id. at 1996.
190. Ducks Unlimited Inc., The SWANCC Decision: Implications
for Wetlands and Waterfowl, at http://www.ducks.org/conser-
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many wetlands will remain protected, even if Corps jurisdiction un-
der the CWA is finally determined to include only traditional navi-
gable waters and their immediately adjacent wetlands. 19' However,
due to the SWANCC invalidation of the Migratory Bird Rule as a
basis for jurisdiction under the CWA, some of the most important
wetlands for migratory birds will be removed from all governmental
control. 192 As a result of the vacuum created by the demise of the
Migratory Bird Rule, without further action by state or federal legis-
latures, these waters will likely disappear; leaving in the vacuum's
wake devastating consequences for both migratory bird populations
and the interstate commerce generated by people who travel to hunt
or to photograph them.
The Hydrologic Cycle
The nature of water is impermanence and transience."' Water
moves in a continuous cycle, falling as rain or snow, which then
vation/404-report.asp (Sept. 2002) (on file with the Fordham Envi-
ronmental Law Journal) (determining the impact of the SWANCC
decision in light of the federal Swampbusters program, which serves
as an economic disincentive to convert wetlands on agricultural land
into farmland, along with state regulatory programs regulating ac-
tivities that impact wetlands based on different jurisdictional limita-
tions the Corps may eventually settle on, from no waters other than
navigable and immediately adjacent, to a 100-mile "adjacency"
buffer zone).
191. Id. at 43. Much of the isolated wetlands in the Mississippi
alluvial valley, where the SWANCC property was located, would be
covered by Swampbusters and state regulations even were the Clean
Water Act jurisdiction to be severely limited. Id.
192. Id. at 47, 51. The Prairie Pothole Region, Rainwater Basin of
Nebraska and Southern Great Plains Region, which are important for
migrating, wintering, and breeding waterfowl, will lose CWA pro-
tection after SWANCC since most of the wetlands are isolated intra-
state waters with jurisdiction based solely on the Migratory Bird
Rule. This effect would be heightened if the Swampbuster program
is weakened or repealed. Id.
193. PIELOU, E.C., FRESH WATER, 1 (University of Chicago Press,
1998).
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evaporates back into the atmosphere or drains into the sea through
surface or groundwater connections. 194 There is no such thing as
non-circulating water; given enough time even water trapped in a
glacier will once again circulate. 195 Humans, animals, and many
plants can process only fresh water, which is water that is collected
as groundwater ponds, lakes, or streams. Evapotranspiration or
evaporation of water directly from land areas, results in almost nine
percent of land precipitation, with the remaining ninety-one percent
of land precipitation coming from evaporated seawater. 196 Although
a lot of precipitation falling on land runs directly into lakes or
streams, or soaks into the ground and is incorporated into the
groundwater, an appreciable amount of water is held in wetlands or
areas where the soil is periodically or continuously saturated.1 97
Wetlands have a number of concrete values: hydrologic, water
quality improvement, ecological, and recreational. 198 The hydro-
logic values of wetlands include groundwater recharge, maintenance
of regional precipitation patterns, and erosion control during storms.
Unlike dry earth, where rainfall quickly runs off into streams and
rivers without ever having time to fully saturate the soil, wetlands
hold water and allow the soil to become saturated, which in turn re-
charges groundwater levels.' 99 The evaporation of water sitting ex-
posed in wetlands maintains regional precipitation patterns by keep-
194. Id.
195. Id. at 2-3.
196. MOORE, JAMES W., BALANCING THE NEEDS OF WATER USE, 2
(Springer-Verlag, 1989).
197. Id. at60.
198. Id. at 61. See also Federal Water Pollution Control Act
Amendment of 1977, No. 95-139, at 52 (Hon. Robert W. Edgar,
Hon. Gary A. Myers-"Filling wetlands and diverting streams with-
out careful consideration of the ecological balance which could be
upset is not only environmentally unsound, but economically un-
wise."). See also Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendment
of 1977, No. 95-139 at 56 (Jimmy Carter, Walter Mondale-"This
Nation's wetlands are a most valuable resource.").
199. WETLAND MANAGEMENT, ENVT. AND NATURAL RES. POL'Y
DIv. OF THE CONG. RESEARCH SERV. OF THE LIBRARY OF CONG.,
COMM. ON ENVT. & PUB. WORKS, U.S. SENATE, No.97-11, at 49
(July 1982).
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ing the moisture level of the atmosphere high.2 °0 Wetlands control
storm erosion by limiting the number and severity of flash floods by
serving as flood plains. 20 1 Water flow through wetlands is slow, al-
lowing time for sedimentation and filtration, and the decomposition
of particulate and chemical pollutants.20 2
Open waters in the agricultural areas of the United States, such as
wetlands and small, isolated waters help regulate both rainfall and
temperature which are vital for successful agriculture. Much atmos-
pheric water, and therefore precipitation, comes from local open wa-
ter. In agricultural areas, this is usually characterized as originating
from small isolated ponds and wetlands. 20 3 The less open water
there is in the agricultural center of the United States, the less pre-
cipitation will fall and the more water that must be imported. Open
water also functions as a "heat sink," absorbing energy in the form
of heat when the ambient temperature is hotter than that of the water;
conversely releasing heat energy when the ambient temperature is
lower than that of the water.204 This results in a more constant tem-
perature in the areas surrounding open bodies of water.20 5 Without
the temperature-dampening and precipitation-aiding effects of open
bodies of water in the agricultural center of the United States, agri-
culture could become significantly more difficult and more costly as
farmers find themselves suddenly working against nature.
Wetlands host a wide range of plants which thrive in saturated
soils and provide a habitat for many animals, including those who
use one wetland and those who visit various wetlands as resting and
200. Id. at 48.
201. Id. at49.
202. Id. See also ELIZABETH ROBERT BERNER, GLOBAL
ENVIRONMENT: WATER, AIR AND GEOCHEMICAL CYCLES, 236 (Pren-
tice Hall, 1996) (describing physical, chemical and biological proc-
esses in standing water and their affect on water composition).
203. JAMES W. MOORE, BALANCING THE NEEDS OF WATER USE, 2
(Springer-Verlag, 1989).
204. Arctic Climatology and Meteorology, at http://nsidc.
org/arcticmet/glossary/heat-sink.html (Mar. 2003) (on file with
Fordham Environmental Law Journal).
205. George Burba et al., Surface Energy Fluxes of an Open Water
Area in a Mid-Latitude Prairie Wetland, University of Nebraska-
Lincoln, at http://snrs 1 .unl.edu/GeorgeB/PresOW.abstract.html
(1999) (on file with the Fordham Environmental Law Journal).
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feeding sites while migrating.2°6 Migratory birds rely on wetlands
while on their journeys, and the destruction of wetlands therefore
leads to a corresponding decline in bird populations. 207 Regardless
of size, wetlands are water systems and are part of the greater hydro-
logic cycle; alterations affecting the movement or quality of water in
the wetlands greatly affect water movement and quality in other ar-
eas.20 8 Additionally, the fact that a wetland may dry out seasonally
does not necessarily lessen its import in the hydrologic cycle. One
may infer that seasonal wetlands play a greater role in migratory bird
migration or plant habitat than permanent wetlands.20 9
The area in dispute in SWANCC lies within the greater Mississippi
basin. It has recently been recognized as the site of a complex, com-
pletely interconnected and immensely important hydrologic cycle
vital to the United States environment, crop health in United States
farming regions, commercial shipping in the Midwest, and ground
water recharging.21 As the interconnection of the hydrologic cycle
became better understood, Congress gave the Corps the duty to bal-
ance the needs of economic development with those of environ-
mental protection.2 1' Courts in turn deferred to the Corps' interpre-
tation of the statutes impacting its new role as protector of environ-
206. Id. at 46-47.
207. Id. at 47.
208. Id. at 36.
209. Id. at 46-47.
210. GCIP: Global Energy and Water Cycle Experiment (GEWEX)
Continental-Scale International Project, A Review of Progress and
Opportunities, National Research Council, 1998. The project was
set up to better understand the complex hydrologic cycle in the Mis-
sissippi basin and to determine the impact conversion of wetland to
farmland has on the system as a hydrologic whole. The study is still
ongoing, the 1998 report sets up study parameters and controls.
211. DAVID SALVESEN, WETLANDS: MITIGATING AND REGULATING
DEVELOPMENT IMPACTS, 21 (The Urban Land Institute, 1990). The
1972 Clean Water Act changed Corps permitting process from a
straight "navigability" test to a complicated cost-benefit analysis of
the greater impact of wetland loss on the hydrology and biological
diversity of the area. See also Federal Water Pollution Control Act
Amendment of 1977, No. 95-139, at 60. Hon. Jennings Randolf-
"necessity for broad jurisdiction to protect our interrelated and inter-
dependent water resource."
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mental integrity, including its interpretation of the term "navigable
waters. 21 2 Although the Supreme Court refused to resolve the issue
of completely isolated, non-navigable intrastate wetlands, the Court
recognized the integrated nature of the hydrologic cycle and deferred
to the Corps' understanding of what waters needed to be regulated in
213order to achieve the goals of the CWA. Additionally, the Court
found that "the Corps' ecological judgment about the relationship
between waters and their adjacent wetlands provides an adequate
basis for a legal judgment that adjacent wetlands may be defined as
'waters' under the Act." 214
Cumulative Impact
In light of the complexity of the hydrologic cycle, it is important
for the courts to defer to the Corps' interpretation of the statute with
which it is charged to enforce. The Corps is best able to determine
how to accomplish the goals of the CWA as promulgated by Con-
gress. However, in SWANCC, the Supreme Court arbitrarily im-
posed the artificial national-versus-local differentiation of Lopez and
Morrison onto the complex, interconnected web of the hydrologic
cycle. Unlike the clear "local" state police power over criminal mat-
ters, the interconnectedness of the hydrologic cycle means that even
a seemingly "local" isolated intrastate water has significant, non-
attenuated "national" impact on North American migratory bird
populations as well as national precipitation and groundwater levels.
In Lopez, Chief Justice Rehnquist limited Congress' Commerce
Clause power when it "neither regulates a commercial activity nor
contains a requirement that the [activity] be connected in any way to
interstate commerce. ' 215 The question of whether an activity im-
pacts interstate commerce is one of degree, to be answered by a
212. SALVESEN, supra note 212, at 461.
213. Id. at 463. "The regulation of activities that cause water pollu-
tion cannot rely on.. .artificial lines.. .but must focus on all waters
that together form the entire aquatic system. Water moves in hydro-
logic cycles and the pollution of the is part of the aquatic system,
regardless of whether it is above or below an ordinary high water
mark, or mean high tide line, will affect the water quality of the
other waters within that aquatic system." Id.
214. Id.
215. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 551 (1995).
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216
thorough factual inquiry. While the possession of guns in school
zones could not be proven to substantially impact interstate com-
merce in Lopez, the same is not true of the Migratory Bird Rule.
Migratory birds generate an immense amount of interstate commerce
from those who follow them across state lines for purposes of pho-
tography and for hunting.217
Many wetlands used as habitat by migratory birds will be vulner-
able to destruction and agricultural conversion with the Supreme
Court's elimination of the Migratory Bird Rule as grounds for Corps
jurisdiction under the CWA. Migratory bird populations will decline
because of scarcity of food, water, and nesting sites in the few re-
maining protected wetlands. A decrease in bird populations will
cause a corresponding decline in interstate commerce. Instead of
being able to hunt birds at isolated locales, hunters will be forced to
concentrate in a few areas, where the reports of multiple guns will
lower the chances of any one hunter to complete his objective. In
the same vein, birdwatchers will no longer have the opportunity to
view migratory birds in pristine wetlands and will have to jostle with
hunters for the chance to see anything. Many will stop traveling be-
cause the loss of wetlands will no longer make the trip worthwhile.
The Corps was given the power under the CWA to maintain the
environmental health of "navigable waters," defined as "waters of
the United States." In determining the true scope of its jurisdiction,
the Corps had to look to the Congressional intent behind the CWA.
Promulgated in "the environmental decade," the CWA was Con-
gress' attempt to protect waters not just from navigation obstruc-
tions, but from environmental poisoning. The nature of the hydro-
logic cycle dictates that the poisoning of waters in a small isolated
upstream pond may lead to widespread poisoning of downstream,
navigable waters. In fact, the interconnectedness of the hydrologic
cycle is so complete that even an isolated site with no surface con-
nection and no direct link to groundwater may nevertheless nega-
tively affect a larger and more critical body of water.
The biologic cycle relies on and bolsters the hydrologic cycle. The
availability of fresh, unpolluted water and surrounding grasses limits
the growth potential of species living in an area. When the biologi-
216. Id. at 562-63.
217. United States v. Byrd, 609 F.2d 1204,1209 (7 th Cir. 1979) (cit-
ing S. REP. No. 92-1236, at 144 (1972)).
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cal population exceeds the carrying load218 of a wetland, the popula-
tion cannot increase and may, in fact, decrease due to crowding. The
plight of migratory birds is exacerbated because they rely on many
wetland habitats scattered across the country. Wetland destruction
leading to a lower carrying load for just one of the wetlands on a
migratory route will limit the entire population of migratory birds.
In Leslie Salt Co., the Ninth Circuit found that a wetland caused by
the temporary, seasonal pooling of water in an isolated and aban-
doned intrastate salt pit without any surrounding hydrophilic wetland
vegetation, 219 fell within the "water of the United States" over which
the Corps had regulatory jurisdiction. The Court based its decision
on the refuge, which the area provided for migratory birds. 2 The
importance of the wetland within the hydrologic "water of the
United States" is even more pronounced in SWANCC, and the loss of
Corps regulatory jurisdiction will lead to even worse consequences
than did the loss of jurisdiction over the waters scattered among the
housing tracts in Wilson.2 2 1 Here, the waters are part of a naturalized
biological system, evolving from a barren strip mine to a highly
vegetated system with many seasonal ponds.222 Not just a stop for
migratory birds, the area serves as a breeding ground for herons,
highlighting the relative permanence of the waters at the site.223
218. The carrying load of an area is the maximum number of bio-
logical units that area can sustain.
219. WETLAND MANAGEMENT, supra note 200 at 49. The report
defines wetlands as transitional systems between terrestrial and
aquatic systems where the water table is close to, or at, the surface.
Wetlands must be inundated by surface or ground water frequently
enough to support a prevalence of hydrophytes, plants that thrive in
water-logged soil and semi-aquatic habitats, or aquatic life requiring
water-saturated soil for growth and reproduction. Id.
220. Id.
221. See United States v. Wilson, 133 F.3d 251, 253-54 (4 th Cir.
1997).
222. Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. United States
Army Corps of Eng'rs, 191 F.3d 845, 848 (7 th Cir. 1999), at 848,
vacated by 531 U.S. 159 (2001).
223. U.S. Geological Survey, at http://www.mbr-pwrc.usgs.
gov/id/framlst/Lifehistory/lh1940.html (last viewed Mar. 1, 2004).
Herons breed in wetlands and open-water areas, egg incubation takes
28 days and it is 56-60 days until the fledglings are ready to fly. The
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Such long-standing waters occur during the spring season, the grow-
ing season for hydrophytes, which should further qualify the area as
a wetland under the government definition.
Migratory birds "remember" where favorable resting sites are, and
"plan" their route so as to minimize their flight. They visit the sites
for vital rest and feeding before continuing on their arduous jour-
224
ney. The loss of viable places for rest is one of the greatest con-
tributors to migration mortality, which can affect up to half of the
migrating population.2 25 Proper sites in the United States portion of
the migratory corridor are limited to narrow areas between agricul-
tural plots and, unless in bad health or facing bad weather, birds are
selective about their resting locations, choosing to stop in areas with
many insects and plants as well as accessible water. 2 2 6 Both migra-
tory birds and commercial housing contractors have a vested interest
in many of these sites. Without the Corps regulation of such areas,
they will be commercially exploited. This exploitation renders
greater peril than the mere loss of a favorable site for rest. Now,
with the area under development, the birds must either continue fly-
ing far distances with low fat reserves or they can stop and die as
victims of malnutrition or predation.
When the number of stopover sites is reduced, the migratory popu-
lation must crowd into the remaining, possibly inferior, stopover
sites. These remaining sites cannot support all of the displaced
birds. Each site has a carrying load, a limit on the amount of birds
which it can support. 227 When that load is exceeded, all of the birds
at the site will suffer. An unfavorable proportion will contribute to
the demise of the birds, as there will be more birds than resources
available at the site. Although the birds stay at any one site for only
water at the SWANCC site must remain for at least 74 days, over 2
months, from the time the first egg is laid until the brood is ready to
take their first flight. Id.
224. Smithsonian National Zoological Park, at http://natzoo.
si.edu/ConservationAndScience/MigratoryBirds/FactSheet/ (last view-
ed Mar. 1, 2004). Most neotropical birds, those that breed in North
America and winter in Latin America, have a one-way migration of
over one thousand miles. Id.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, at http://training.fws.gov/
history/priorities/priomig.html (last viewed Mar. 1, 2004).
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a few days, the bulk of migration happens within a relatively short
period of time, leading to conspicuous congregation of masses of
birds at stopover sites.228 This leads to many deaths, as birds are too
weak to fly much farther, yet cannot get enough food at any stopover
site to stave off death by starvation. Hence, one sure result of the
SWANCC decision, the decrease in of the carrying load of any one
part of the migratory corridor, will affect the entire migratory bird
population by limiting the numbers of birds who can successfully
navigate to the smallest carrying load of any one portion of the mi-
gratory corridor.2 2 9 Furthermore, some wild migratory birds may
turn to landing in poultry farms seeking to obtain high-protein feed.
This interaction can lead to the transmission of disease from the wild
birds to the farmed fowl, with possibly disastrous consequences for
humans. 230 The current Dutch avian flu has led to culls2 3 1 of thou-
sands of farm fowl and to at least one human death.232
In SWANCC, as in Lopez, the Supreme Court found that the regu-
lation under consideration was too attenuated from any interstate
commerce to vest Coi-gress with the sought after regulatory power
under the Commerce Clause. However, the artificial lines dividing
state and national interests developed in Lopez fail when applied to
the fluid, interconnected web of the hydrologic and biologic cycles.
Wetland destruction on a local level directly affects interstate com-
merce due to nationwide migratory bird population decline. The
efforts of the Supreme Court to remain true to Lopez reasoning has
brought forth a decidedly un-Lopez-like result. Where the national
impact on interstate commerce is forced to take a an inferior position
to local control over land and water use, neither the interests of the
locality nor the nation are served.
228. Smithsonian National Zoological Park, at http://natzoo.
si.edu/ConservationAndScience/MigratoryBirds/FactSheet/ (last view-
ed Mar. 1, 2004).
229. U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, at http://training.fws.gov/
history/priorities/priomig.htm (last viewed Mar. 1, 2004).
230. Alison Abbott, Chicken Flu Races through Dutch Poultry
Farms, 422 NATURE 247 (2003).
231. Id. Culls are when humans kill off whole populations of pos-
sibly infected animals in an effort to prevent transmission of the dis-
ease to other areas, farm animals, or humans. Id.
232. Alison Abbott, Human Fatality Adds Fresh Impetus to Fight
Against Bird Flu, 423 NATURE 5 (2003).
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